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The European Economic Community-
A Profile
Utz P. Toepke*
To enable those readers who may be unfamiliar with the history and
structure of the European Economic Community to better understand the
articles in this symposium, Dr. Toepke reviews the background, the institu-
tions and the underlying theory of this unique legal phenomenon.
INTRODUCTION
Two main objectives underlie this article. Initially, the readers of
this symposium on the European Economic Community (EEC) need a
descriptive overview in order to understand and appreciate the phe-
nomenon called the Common Market which has now existed in West-
ern Europe for a quarter century. Thus, a point of reference will be
provided for the detailed discussion of a variety of legal and social is-
sues in the EEC by the distinguished writers in this symposium. Sec-
ondly, these issues will .be put in perspective by showing that
everything relating to the EEC is subject to the overriding objective
mandated by its constitutive charter, the Treaty of Rome-namely the
objective of integrating ten separate economies and distinctly different
societies. Only when mindful of this objective can the reader view the
Community for what it is: an organism of supranational character in
constant evolution towards greater unity in virtually all aspects of life.
Only this view allows an understanding of the multi-layered complex-
ity often encountered in the attempt to solve a particular legal problem
in EEC law. It is in the greater context of integration, with its attend-
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ant economic, social and political aspects, that such legal problems are
usually resolved. The utilization of industrial and commercial property
rights in the EEC is but one example. While this subject is treated in
much greater depth elsewhere in this symposium, the introductory re-
marks in this section will conclude with an observation on that topic as
illustrative of the way in which the Community consolidates a diversity
of legal opinions in the common interest of all members.
I. THE COMMON MARKET
In 1957, six independent nations in Western Europe entered into a
historic treaty that has become known by the name of the city in which
it was signed, the Treaty of Rome.1 In Article 1, the contracting parties
agreed to establish among themselves a European Economic Commu-
nity. The roots of this remarkable event may be traced both to a suc-
cess and a failure in post-war European attempts to unite after a long
history of rivalries and bloody conflicts. Six years prior to signing the
Rome Treaty, the same nations had already agreed, in the so-called
Treaty of Paris, to set up the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), thereby placing the whole of their coal and steel production
under the command of a supranational, integrated organization headed
by a "High Authority." Thus, for the first time in their history, na-
tional governments in Europe had agreed to delegate part of their sov-
ereignty, albeit in selected sectors of their national economies, to a nAw
type of international institution, a European authority enjoying exequ-
tive powers to take decisions in the interest of all six countries. This
delegation of sovereignty in the 1951 Treaty of Paris represente, a
unique turning point in European history, and set in motion a process
of European unification that continues to this date.
The ECSC became a full success and inspired a European enthusi-
asm which only one year later, in 1952, led to another attempt at unifi-
cation among the six countries. In May 1952, the six governments
signed a treaty for the purpose of creating a European Defence Com-
munity (EDC). However, lacking a common European foreign policy
as well as a general economic and military consensus, the plan was
doomed to failure. The pace of integration had accelerated too quickly
for some, and in August 1954 the French National Assembly rejected
the idea. In the aftermath of this failure, the governments of the six
I Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(entered in force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. The original signatories were
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The Treaty entered into
force on January 1, 1958, after ratification by the parliaments of the signatory nations.
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countries decided to adopt a more realistic approach toward unification
in Western Europe.2 It was agreed, building on the success of the
ECSC and cautiously avoiding the political mistakes involved with the
EDC, to broaden cooperation between the six countries in the
economic field. At the same time, prospects for the common develop-
ment and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were explored.
Eventually, these efforts culminated in the signing of two treaties-one
setting up the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the
other creating the European Economic Community (EEC).
With these two treaties entering into force in 1958, there existed,
therefore, three separate supranational organizations in Western Europe,
each based on its own constitutive treaty and each equipped with its
own distinct institutions. In April 1965, however, the six countries con-
cluded what has become known as the Merger Treaty,3 establishing a
single Council of Ministers and a single executive Commission for all
three entities. After ratification by the Member States, the Treaty be-
came effective on July 1, 1967 and since then the three previously sepa-
rate Communities have been combined and are now correctly referred
to in the plural as the "European Communities" (EC).
The European Economic Community (EEC) remains the most im-
portant of the three entities because its scope is unlimited in the
economic field. It is not restricted to a selected sector of the economy
like the ECSC or Euratom and it is the EEC which has encouraged a
growth in trade among its members "to a very substantial degree." 4
Also, the Treaty of Rome is significant for creating a new legal order
among independent nations which is imposed over the legal systems of
the Member States not by force, as has happened so many times before
in European history, but by mutual consent as the rule of law. The
following remarks focus entirely on the EEC.
A. Development
The Treaty of Rome "is more than an agreement creating recipro-
cal obligations between the contracting States."5 It is the common en-
2 This decision was reached at a conference of the six Foreign Ministers, held at Messina,
Italy, in June 1955.
3 Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communi-
ties, April 8, 1965, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
TREATIES B8030 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Merger Treaty].
4 I. WALTER, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET. GROWTH AND PATTERNS OF TRADE AND
PRODUCTION 155 (1967).




deavor of several European nations to strive, "for an unlimited
period,"6 for economic expansion and higher standards of living as well
as closer relations among themselves, ultimately achieving a political
union of the peoples of Europe.7 The more immediate tasks of the
EEC, in 1958, were the establishment of a "common market" by creat-
ing a customs union, through the gradual dismantling of all quotas, tar-
iffs and other trade barriers that inhibited, at that time, the free
movement of goods between the six countries.8 In addition, the Treaty
called for the free movement of persons, services and capital. 9 These
are the famous four freedoms of the Community-free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital-that have been filled with life
since 1958 by a number of implementing regulations and, more impor-
tantly, several judgments of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities.
Membership in the EEC is open to any European state.10 How-
ever, as the Commission stated to the Council upon the occasion of
Greece's accession to the EEC, the principles of pluralist democracy
and respect for human rights form part of the common heritage of all
Member States and adherence to them is therefore an essential require-
ment of membership. This is corroborated by the "Joint Declaration of
Fundamental Rights" made by the political institutions of the Commu-
nity on April 5, 1977.12
Membership of the EEC has been enlarged twice since its begin-
ning. In January 1972, treaties of accession were signed between the
original six Member States and Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the
United Kingdom. Subsequently, the people of Norway rejected mem-
bership in a referendum held in that country during September of 1972,
but the other three States became new members of the three Communi-
ties on January 1, 1973. In May 1979, a treaty of accession was signed
with Greece, and this country has become the Community's tenth
member, on January 1, 1981. Negotiations for full membership are
currently underway with Portugal and Spain. Mter the accession of
6 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 240.
7 Id. at Preamble and art. 2.
8 Id. at arts. 2, 3.
9 Id. at arts. 48, 52, 59, 67.
10 Id. at art. 237.
11 12 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 5) 73 (1979).
12 See 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 103) 1 (1977). See also Memorandum on the Accession of
the European Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights, adopted Apr. 4, 1979,
12 BULL. EutL CoMM., Supp. 2/79 (1979).
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Greece, the EEC now includes approximately 670,000 square miles and
has a population just short of 270 million.
The establishment of the common market as a free trade zone
among the original six Member States, in the sense of a customs union,
was achieved in July 1968, ahead of the timetable laid down in the
EEC Treaty. At that time, the Community also set up its common ex-
ternal tariff system and thus became a homogeneous trading block
within the concert of trading nations. This event had been signaled one
year earlier when the Commission signed on behalf of the Community,
in addition to the individual Member States, the multinational trade
agreements reached during the Kennedy round of negotiations within
the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
Not long after the achievement of a complete customs union, the
EEC took another decisive step towards institutionalization when the
six governments, in April 1970, agreed to provide the Community with
its own resources. When first advanced by the Commission in 1965, the
plan lead to a hostile reaction by de Gaulle's France and subsequently
to the so-called "policy of the empty chair" practiced by the French
government during the course of 1965. At their summit conference at
The Hague in December 1969, the leaders of the six countries redis-
covered the political will that had helped to create the EEC in the first
place and decided to allow the Commission to collect, on the Commu-
nity's behalf, all customs duties on products imported into the EEC as
well as all levies on agricultural imports. In addition, the EEC was to
receive up to one percent of the value added tax (VAT), levied on an
agreed assessment basis within the Member States. These decisions,
when finalized and ratified, marked the beginning of the financial au-
tonomy of the Community which has enabled it to finance the annual
Community budget entirely from its own resources.
B. Institutions
The Treaty of Rome established a number of independent Com-
munity institutions modeled after those created by the ECSC Treaty.
The two great minds behind the ideas that formed the new Europe,
Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, had recognized that only by creat-
ing an institutional form, based upon agreed procedures reflecting the
international purpose of the Community, would the undertaking of
unifying Europe be successful. In creating an independent staff of
qualified people, solely committed to the objectives of the Treaty, they
believed, the natural state of mind of national governments resisting
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the transfer of powers could be balanced and eventually overcome.
The result is a power center at the heart of the Community, called the
Commission, combining both executive and legislative functions. In
addition, the Commission is given the role of a guardian of the Treaty
in that it "shall ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the meas-
ures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied."1 3 The
other major institutions are the Parliament (called the Assembly in the
Treaty), the Council of Ministers, and the Court of Justice.
1. Commission
Generally speaking, the Commission is the motor of the Commu-
nity and the Council of Ministers its political control. 4 The Commis-
sion is organized into twenty Directorates (e.g., Directorate for
Economic and Financial Affairs; Agriculture; Regional Policy; Compe-
tition; External Relations; etc.) and today, after Greece's accession,
consists of fourteen members, who are appointed "by common accord
of the governments of the Member States" for a renewable term of of-
fice of four years.' Members of the Commission are chosen on the
grounds of their general competence and independence. Both the
Treaty of Rome and the Merger Treaty make it clear that the Commis-
sion is completely independent in the performance of its duties. 16 Only
the Parliament, if it carries a motion of censure by a two-thirds major-
ity, can force the resignation of the Commission as a body.
17
The Commission's primary task, in addition to the guardian role
mentioned already, is to draw up proposals to further the interests of
the Community. It can do so where the Treaty so provides or if it con-
siders a particular proposal necessary."8 To this end, Article 15 of the
Merger Treaty provides that the Council and the Commission shall
consult each other and shall settle their methods of cooperation by
13 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 155.
14 As was mentioned, the Member States agreed in the 1965 Merger Treaty, note 3 supra, to
establish a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities. The Merger
Treaty amended or replaced a number of provisions in the basic treaties of the previously separate
bodies. It would be impossible in the context of this profile to review the details of these changes,
or even the full scope of the original articles in the Rome Treaty. For further study, the reader is
referred, inter alia, to 4 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, Preliminary Observations on Articles 145-154, No. 3,
and Preliminary Observations on Artidles 155-163, No. 3, THE LAW OF THE EuROPEAN ECONOMIC
CoMMUNrrY (Supp. 1979).
15 Merger Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 11.
16 The Commission's duties, in principle, are described in Article 155 of the Rome Treaty,
note 1 supra.
17 Id. at art. 144.
18 Id. at art. 155.
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agreement. This cannot, however, mean that the Commission is re-
quired to consult the Council on every occasion, especially not before it
wants to address a recommendation or opinion to that body. 9 The
Commission is given a fair amount of discretion in performing its du-
ties in the Treaty of Rome and the Merger Treaty and consequently
this consultation requirement must be considered fulfilled where the
Commission aligns the general direction and contents of its activities
with the Council, save for those situations where a specific provision of
Community law demands consultation before taking action. Lastly,
Article 155 gives the Commission "its own power of decision" as well
as the delegated powers that may be conferred on it, from time to time,
by the Council. That phrase, "its own power of decision," can only be
interpreted to mean that the Commission has certain implied powers,
even though a specific power to take decisions may not have been
granted, whenever this would appear appropriate "to ensure the proper
functioning and development of the common market."20
Article 163 of the Treaty of Rome and Article 17 of the Merger
Treaty regulate the manner in which Commission decisions are taken.
"Decision" in this sense means every action by the Commission as a
body, not merely the measure technically specified in Article 189,
which will be discussed later. The law provides for but one procedure
as regards the validity of Commission actions. To be valid, a Commis-
sion decision needs only a simple majority of the number of Commis-
sion members provided for in Article 10 of the Merger Treaty
(currently 14). In addition, decisions must be taken in the presence of a
quorum that is established by the Commission itself in its Provisional
Rules of Procedure. With Greece having joined as the tenth member
of the Community, the Commission recently raised this quorum to
eight members.2' Commission members, however, need not appear
and vote in person at a meeting, as these comments may appear to
indicate. Article 11 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure allows for
a written method of decision-making, basically by circulating a draft of
the proposed decision to all Commission members and requiring them
to raise objections by a specified date or the decision will be adopted.
This procedure of taking decisions "by default" is in wide use within
the Commission.2"
19 Accord, SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 14, at point 155.15.
20 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 155.
21 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) 16 (1981).
22 For more details, see SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 14, at point 163.04.
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2. Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers is made up of representatives of the gov-
ernments of all Member States. Usually, each government choses
which minister to send depending on the matter up for consideration,
e.g., the Minister of Agriculture, Finance, Justice, etc. The "main"
Member State representative on the Council, however, is each coun-
try's Foreign Minister. The Council is assisted by a Committee of Per-
manent Representatives (ambassadors of the Member States), often
referred to as "COREPER," and by large groups of experts. The
COREPER was acknowledged by the Merger Treaty, which gave it the
respoiisibility for preparing the deliberations of the Council.23 The
Treaty of Rome contains a large number of provisions giving the
Council the power to take decisions which result in Community law-
making. This has led to a common belief that the Council of Ministers
is the legislature of the EEC while the Commission is the executive.
This view is superficial, at best. First, the Council can act on many
occasions only upon a proposal from the Commission. Second, as has
been described already, the Commission has its own rights of decision-
making which, in individual situations, may be of a law-making nature.
Most importantly, though, it is often another institution than the Coun-
cil that creates new law in the EEC as shall be seen; this is the Court in
Luxembourg.
Article 148 of the Treaty of Rome purports to introduce a voting
procedure, as far as the Council is concerned, that is based on the sys-
tem of simple majority. Nothing, however, could be further from the
truth. Apart from the special Treaty provisions requiring a qualified
majority or unanimity during the various stages of historical develop-
ment of the Common Market a political decision of the six govern-
ments in January 1966 to resolve the 1965 crisis of the "empty chair
policy" requires, to this date, quite contrary to the Treaty of Rome, that
the Council shall seek a consensus on all matters before it. This phe-
nomenon is known as the Luxembourg compromise. While it has been
relaxed, to some degree, on certain issues of secondary importance, the
fact remains that the Council of Ministers still insists on reaching unan-
imous decisions "when important interests of a Member State are at
stake." Gaston Thorn, the new President of the Commission and long-
time member of the Council of Ministers during his years as Cabinet
Minister in Luxembourg's government, blames this procedure when he
23 Merger Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4.
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says "the Council is not really the Council any more. 24
In order to carry out their respective tasks, both the Council and
the Commission can issue regulations, directives, decisions, recommen-
dations and opinions.25 Only the first three are legally binding. Regu-
lations become Community law automatically upon their adoption and
are generally applicable in all Member States. Directives are binding,
as to the results to be achieved, upon each Member State to which they
are addressed, but they leave to the Member States the choice of form
and methods of attaining these results. Decisions are binding upon
those to whom they are addressed (Member States, enterprises or indi-
viduals) as single-case determinations. The nomenclature provided in
Article 189, however, is not exhaustive.26 Both the Council and the
Commission may take other legally relevant action of suigeneris char-
acter and have done so in the past (e.g, fiscal actions; actions with re-
spect to third countries; acts of organizational nature, etc.).
3. European Council
Not to be confused with the Council of Ministers is the European
Council, born out of another political compromise in Europe, at the
Paris Summit in December 1974. At this summit meeting, the nine
Member States accepted a suggestion, made in order to revive the spirit
of the earlier Hague Summit which had resulted in a call for a Euro-
pean economic and monetary union, to meet three times a year and
whenever necessary as the "European Council" to debate European af-
fairs and important questions of foreign policy. While not an institu-
tion established by the Treaty, this European Council has become an
important instrument in the political process of European integration,
representing the highest level of political authority of all Member
States. It is composed of the Heads of State or Government of each
Member State.
4. European Parliament
The European Parliament is limited in its powers by the Treaty of
Rome to those of consultation; it has no legislative function. However,
the Parliament which sits in Strasbourg and sometimes in Luxembourg,
24 President Thorn added that the Council of Ministers stopped working when ministers
stopped speaking frankly to each other. Crisis in EC Institutions.- Thorn on What Should be Done,
224 EUROPE 22, 23 (1981).
25 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 189.
26 VON DER GROEBEN, VON BOECKH & THIESING, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG VERTRAG (2d ed.
1974) (Anrn. II 2 to Article 189).
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has the "power of the purse" in the Community in that it must approve
the Community budget. Recently elected for the first time by direct
universal suffrage, as required for the past twenty-two years by Article
138 of the Rome Treaty, the Parliament asserted this budgetory power
in a dispute over the 1980 budget. On December 13, 1979, the new
Parliament, elected in June of that year, rejected the draft budget trans-
mitted to it by the Council for the first time in Community history and
asked for a new draft to be prepared. The dispute was not settled until
the summer of the following year.27
Parliament now has 434 members, 410 of which were elected di-
rectly in June 1979, and 24 Greek members who were designated by
their national parliament as were all European parliamentarians until
the historic elections of 1979. These elections, in fact, marked the first
transnational elections in man's history and they have been described,
by the French Gaullist Edgar Faure, as the passage of Europe beyond
purely economic unification to political and social unification as well.28
This may explain why every political party in Europe (with the possible
exception of the British Labour Party), notwithstanding its opposition
to the idea of European integration, was anxious to be represented in
this forum of Community public opinion that will undoubtedly help
shape the future of Europe.
5. Court of Justice
The Court of Justice has the task of ensuring that in the interpreta-
tion and application of the three basic treaties (ECSC, EEC and
Euratom), as well as the secondary legislation issuing under these trea-
ties, the law is observed. 9 Far beyond this role, however, the Court
has evolved over the years to become a prime integrator of the Com-
mon Market. Many of its judgments have created new law, advancing
the interests of the Community, and all of them (save for the Court's
jurisprudence related to employee disputes between the Community
and its staff) show a consistent pattern of taking aim at the remaining
barriers to intra-Community trade or at any attempts to partition the
market anew. The areas involving the free movement of goods30 and
the Treaty's rules on competition 3' are perhaps the most important ex-
27 It should be repeated here, for reasons of completeness, -that the Parliament can fire the
Commission as a whole if it passes a no-confidence vote by a two-thirds majority.
28 See 214 EUROPE 8 (1979).
29 See, with regard to the European Economic Community, EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art.
164.
30 Id at arts. 30, 36.
31 Id. at arts. 85-86.
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amples in this respect, but many others could be mentioned as well.
32
In fact, the Court's influence on the development of Community law
over the past two decades has been so profound that it has been sug-
gested, given the inactive role played by the Council of Ministers as
legislators and the European Parliament's limited function as an advi-
sory institution, that the Court is the defacto legislative power in the
EEC.33 To some extent, certainly in the two areas just mentioned, this
appears to be an accurate statement.
The Court now consists of eleven judges, one from each Member
State, with the exception of France which today has two judges on the
bench.34 Judges are appointed "by common accord of the Govern-
ments of the Member States for a term of six years," but may be eligi-
ble for reappointment. 5 They are chosen "from persons whose
independence is beyond doubt"36 to stress the impartiality of the Court
and its independence from all other Community institutions as well as
the Member States. Unlike the Commission, where Article 157 (now in
the form of Article 10 of the Merger Treaty) expressly requires that
"only nationals of Member States may be members of the Commis-
sion," the Treaty of Rome does not contain any express requirement of
nationality regarding the appointment to the Court as judge. Instead,
professional competence is the prime measure in this respect. Article
167 demands that only persons "who possess the qualifications re-
quired for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective
countries or who are jurisconsults of recognized competence" shall be
chosen. As long as the governments of the Member States continue to
appoint only nationals of EEC countries, as they have in the past, this
means, for all practical purposes, that only lawyers are eligible for ap-
pointment to the Court, because all Member States require a law de-
gree as a prerequisite for eligibility to their highest judicial office.
In addition to judges, the Court has a number of Advocates Gen-
eral who assist the judges in arriving at their decisions. As of April
1981, there are five Advocates General at the Court. Article 166(2) de-
32 For instance, the Court has clarified the relationship between Community law and the na-
tional laws of the Member States; confirmed the principle of free movement of persons, the right
of establishment and held directly applicable to the Member States the Treaty's equal pay clause
(Article 119).
33 See van Gerven, Twelve Years EEC Competition Law (1962-73) Revisited, I1 Comm. MKT.
L. REv. 38, 46 (1974).
34 Upon the Court's request pursuant to Article 165(3) of the EEC Treaty, note I supra, the
Council increased the number of judges at the Court from ten to eleven, 24 O.J. Etnt. Comm. (No.
L 100) 20 (1981).
35 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 167.
36 Id. at art. 167(1).
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scribes the principal task of an Advocate General broadly as the duty,
to be performed with impartiality and independence, to publicly render
a reasoned report on all disputes before the Court. Everything said
above regarding the appointment of judges applies equally in the case
of Advocates General. One Advocate General is assigned by the Presi-
dent of the Court to each case and he must deliver a written opinion on
the case after the oral hearing has taken place before the Court. This
may be the reason why the Advocate General's opinion is sometimes,
incorrectly, referred to as a judgment of first instance. This opinion is
really nothing more than an informed opinion; it does not decide any-
thing and the Court is in no way bound by it. On the other hand, the
Court does follow the Advocate General's opinion quite often in prac-
tice, and relies on the arguments advanced by the Advocate General in
the reasoning of its judgments. Thus, it is often worthwhile to study the
opinion delivered by the Advocate General carefully.
This is not the appropriate forum to describe the procedure before
the Court in detail.3 7 Generally, the Court decides its cases in full
Court, as a collegiate body. This does not mean, however, that all deci-
sions must be unanimous. Owing to the secrecy attached to the Court's
deliberations, this is just the appearance of matters. Only the judges
will know whether a particular case was decided unanimously or by a
majority of votes.
Essentially, there are two categories of cases which come before
the Court, in addition to the labor and employee relation disputes be-
tween the Community and its staff. Direct actions may be brought by
the Commission, the Council or a Member State challenging the legal-
ity of regulations, directives or decisions by the Council or the Com-
mission.38 Under certain circumstances, a natural or legal person may
bring such a case; for instance, a company can appeal a Commission
decision that is addressed to it in, say, competition matters. Secondly,
references for preliminary rulings can be made by a national court in
one of the Member States on questions involving the interpretation of
both primary and secondary Community law.39 There are other im-
portant instances in which the Court will have jurisdiction to hear a
case, such as a Commission complaint pursuant to Article 169 against a
37 For further study in the English language, the following are recommended by way of exam-
ple only. 1 D.G. VALENTNE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNmEs (1965);
Smrr & HERZoG, supra note 14, at points 173.03-173.20, 175.03-175.30 and 177.03-177.26. See
also A. MACKAY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITEs: CoMPosITIoN,
ORGANIZATION, AND PROCEDURE, IN ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80WS (ABA Press 1980).
38 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 173.
39 Id. at art. 177.
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Member State where the Commission feels that this State has "failed to
fulfill an obligation under this Treaty," or a suit by a private person
against the Commission pursuant to Article 215(2) for damages, based
on the non-contractual liability of the Community as a legal
personality.4
Proceedings before the European Court of Justice, quite unlike
anything lawyers are used to in U.S. litigation, are primarily written
proceedings. They are also considerably swifter than anything U.S.
lawyers have seen in the court rooms of this country. For instance, in
1978 the average duration of direct cases brought before the Court was
little more than nine months, and that of referral cases brought by na-
tional courts for a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice was only
six months.4'
6. Economic and Social Committee
The last Community institution to be mentioned in this article is
the Economic and Social Committee. It assists both the Commission
and the Council and has advisory status. 42 Since Greece's accession
this Committee has 156 members who are representatives of various
sectors of economic and social life in the Member States. Members are
appointed for renewable four year terms by the Council of Ministers.43
The Committee must be consulted before decisions are taken either by
the Commission or the Council on a large number of subjects (e.g., the
free movement of persons, according to Articles 49, 54). Obviously, the
opinions delivered by the Committee have no binding effect, but a fail-
ure to consult the Committee where the consultation is required by law
would make a subsequent decision defective and open it to challenge
before the Court under Article 173. The Committee today has its own
right of initiative, provided by the political decision taken at the Paris
Summit during October 1972 and later implemented, in June 1974,
through a change of the Committee's Rules of Procedure. In recent
years, this right of initiative has been increasingly used by the Commit-
tee, and this institution has thus assumed a more important role in the
political life of the Community. Especially in areas such as industrial
or energy policy, the Community's relations with the outside world and
matters concerning the social aspects of life in the EEC, the Committee
has chosen to make its voice heard. In times of economic crisis based
40 Id. at art. 210.
41 See MAcKAY, supra note 37, at 9.
42 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 193.
43 Id. at art. 194.
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on energy problems, rising inflation, unemployment and other socially
sensitive causes, the Committee can be expected, owing to its diverse
membership, to play an ever increasing role in the formulation of fu-
ture EEC policies.
C. Treaty-Making Authority
Having its own legal personality, the Community is capable of
concluding its own treaties with other states or international organiza-
tions, independent of the Member States. Article 228 makes this clear
and spells out the procedure to be followed for the conclusion of such
treaties. They shall be negotiated by the Commission and concluded
by the Council, "subject to the powers vested in the Commission in this
field," and after consulting the Parliament where so required by the
Treaty. The quoted phrase indicates that the Commission has the com-
petence to conclude certain treaties by itself, without the Council. This
competence is, however, limited in extent and mainly related to the
areas mentioned in Article 229, such as the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) and relations with the United Nations. The
effects of agreements concluded between the Community and outside
parties are also mentioned in Article 228; they are legally binding on
the institutions of the Community and on the Member States.
Article 228, in and of itself, does not establish the right of the
Community to conclude such agreements or treaties. Such right must
be provided for expressly in the Treaty itself.' The two main examples
can be found in Article 113 regarding the Community's common com-
mercial policy, in particular tariff and trade agreements, and Article
238 regarding association agreements. The Community's competence
under the Treaty to conclude international agreements and that of the
Member States to act independently would appear to be mutually ex-
clusive, at least in cases where the cost of financing a particular opera-
tion or mechanism envisaged in the agreement is to be totally borne by
the Community budget.4" It has been accepted, however, that Member
States may also make such agreements or treaties as long as the Com-
munity has not exercised its powers, provided they observe the basic
command of Article 5(2) requiring them to abstain from any measure
44 Under Article 235, however, the Council may take "appropriate measures" if such action is
necessary to attain a Treaty objective.
45 See Advisory Opinion, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, [1979] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 2871, [1979] Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8600. The Court confirmed, on the basis of the
concept of a common commercial policy pursuant to Article 113, that the Community had the
exclusive competence to conclude the Natural Rubber Agreement, with the proviso mentioned in
the texL
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which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the EEC
Treaty.
46
The Community has, in fact, concluded both bilateral and multi-
lateral treaties with most of the world's nations and the major interna-
tional organizations. Most importantly, perhaps, it has entered into
free-trade agreements with the countries of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) that have not joined the EEC, or applied for mem-
bership, such as Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and Norway. Thus, a
huge free trade zone, comprising virtually all of Western Europe and
with more than 300 million people, has been created. Also, the Com-
munity has concluded an important association agreement, in the con-
text of the Yound6 Convention first, and since 1975, in the Lom6
Convention, with a large number of developing countries in Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific. This agreement, in its second stage as of
January 1, 1981, and presently linking sixty developing countries to the
Community, provides for commercial cooperation and allows virtually
all agricultural products originating in these countries free access to the
EEC market. In addition, financial aid is being provided for industrial
development in these countries through the European Development
Fund and the European Investment Bank. Finally, as a further exam-
ple of the Community's external relations, a cooperation agreement
was recently signed between the EEC and the five countries of the As-
sociation of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).47 This cooperation
agreement is the first of its type in that it links the EEC with another
regional group of nations, somewhat like the Community itself. It is an
agreement of non-preferential character which covers trade as well as
economic and development cooperation.
II. THE COMMON RULES
A well-known European official of many years, Robert Marolin,
was asked, in 1980, to explain what the European Community is. It is,
he responded, "essentially a set of rules which the sovereign states have
agreed to respect in their dealings with each other, in well-defined
fields of action, and which do not limit their freedom of movement
46 See Commission v. Council, concerning the European Agreement on Working Conditions
in International Road Transport (E.R.T.A.), [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 263, [1971] CoMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 18134. The Court held that the Member States, in this area governed by the Commu-
nity's common transport policy, had acted in the interest and for the account of the Community,
in accordance with their Article 5 obligations, since they had conducted their negotiations and
concluded the agreement collectively, pursuant to a procedure decided upon by the Council.
47 Agreement of March 7, 1980 between the EEC and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phillipines,
Singapore and Thailand, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 144) 2 (1980).
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elsewhere."48 This response characterizes, better than any other expla-
nation in the author's opinion, the unique make-up of the Community.
It is not merely the far-reaching principles and objectives the Member
States have agreed upon but the common rules and institutions, set up
to provide those principles effective form and to transform them into
day-to-day reality, that have brought about the lasting change in rela-
tions between the Member States. More than anything else during the
thirty-year history of European unification, these common rules and
institutions have forged integration among the participating countries.
It is the common rules and institutions which provide the unofcation
element that makes the Community so unique. An illustration of this is
provided by the free-trade agreements between the Community and all
former EFTA members that have not joined the Community. As a re-
sult of these agreements the common external tariff of the EEC does
not apply in trade between these countries and the Community. The
EFTA countries thus enjoy a customs union with the Community, just
like the EEC Member States among themselves. However, they do not
participate in the Community's common policies as no common rules
or institutions for working together in daily life have been agreed upon.
Therefore, this cooperation between EFTA countries and Community
countries lacks any unification characteristics and is distinctly different
from the bond that exists between the ten Member States.
Foremost among the common rules are the Treaty rules of law.
They, in fact, represent the essence of the unique relationship between
the Member States which has been termed by the Court "a new legal
order in international law."49 One should recall that this legal order is
based on a partial surrender of sovereignty by the Member States.
Consequently, not only individuals and companies are subject to this
legal order but the Member States as well. As a result, Community law
supersedes conflicting national law. The preeminence of Community
law is confirmed by Article 189, which declares that regulations made
by the Council or the Commission (i.e., secondary Community law) are
"binding" and "directly applicable in each Member State." In 1964,
the Court made it clear that this preeminence also precludes any subse-
quent national legislation that would be incompatible with Community
law. The Court reached this result by applying Article 5(2), which de-
mands that Member States refrain from measures that could jeopardize
48 CouNcIL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRs, LEFFINGWELL LEcruES 73 (Council on
Foreign ReL 1980).
49 van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands, note 5 supra.
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the attainment of the objectives of the EEC Treaty.50 A rich body of
case law has since confirmed the supremacy of Community law over
the national legal systems.51 The Court has also held that the obliga-
tions arising out of the Treaty of Rome have direct effects for individu-
als, thus creating personal rights which the national courts must
safeguard.52
A variety of detailed policies, all described in terms of specific
rules that create genuine obligations for the Member States, are set
forth in the Treaty of Rome. Apart from the rules relating to the estab-
lishment of a customs union and the free movement of persons, services
and capital, these are, in particular, the common agricultural policy,
the common transport policy and the Community's competition policy.
The basic principles of the common agriculturalpolicy may be summa-
rized as follows: a single market and common price shall be estab-
lished for all agricultural products, with financial solidarity provided
through a European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. This
has been achieved to a large extent. Community farm produce is to be
given preference over that of third countries. Persons working in agri-
culture are assured a comparable standard of living to that of workers
in other economic sectors. The common transport policy as yet relates
only to transport by road, rail and inland waterway.53 The Council
must decide to what extent the common rules laid down in the Treaty
and a very large number of implementing regulations shall apply to
transport by air or sea, but it has not yet done so. The compelition pol-
icy of the Community is aimed at the removal of existing obstacles to
trade between the Member States and guarantees both fair and free
competition. Article 3(f) demands, as one of the principal tasks of the
50 See F. Costa v. Ente nazionale Energia elettrica impresa gia della Edison Volta (E.N.E.L.),
[1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, [1964] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8023. "The transfer by the
States from their internal legal systems over to the Community legal order, of rights and obliga-
tions to reflect those set forth in the Treaty, therefore entails a definitive limitation of their sover-
eign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act that would be incompatible with the
Community concept cannot be asserted." Id. at 594, [1971] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8023, at
7391.
51 See, e.g., Amministrazione dee Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, [1978] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 629, [1978] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCII) 8476; Minist6re Public v. Ratti, [1979] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1629, [1979] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8569.
52 See, e.g., Ministere Public v. van Wesemael, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 35, [1979] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCII) 8533 (regarding Article 59 and the freedom to provide services); Macarthys
Ltd. v. Wendy Smith, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1275, [1980] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8653
(regarding Article 119 and the requirement of equal pay for men and women); Belgische Radio en
Televisie v. SABAM, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 51, [1974] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCII) 8268
(regarding Articles 85, 86 and the direct effect of the prohibitions of restraints on competition and
the abuse of dominance).
53 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 84.
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Community, "the institution of a system ensuring that competition in
the Common Market is not distorted."
In contrast, the Treaty is virtually silent on matters of general eco-
nomic and monetary policy. Article 113 simply states that after the
transitional period has ended (ie., December 31, 1969, officially), "the
common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles." But
the Treaty does not call for the substitution of the individual economic
and monetary policies of the Member States with a single Community
policy. Rather, this development was urged by the Heads of State or of
Government at their 1969 summit meeting at The Hague. The creation
of a true economic and monetary union among Member States, a de-
clared goal of the Community ever since the Hague Summit, is thus
based upon an extemporaneous political act by the governments of the
Member States rather than any common rules laid down in the Treaty.
It may be capricious to suggest that this is the cause for the failure, so
far, of the plan to achieve the desired results, but the lack of any con-
crete procedures in this field clearly subjected the plan to the vicissi-
tudes of daily political life in the various Member States and the
shifting priorities of the governments in response to the creeping crisis
in all the Community economies since the first oil shock in 1973. To be
fair, it must be said that some progress has been made and some tangi-
ble results have been attained, most notably the European Monetary
System (EMS) in 1979. This may ultimately lead to the achievement of
the final goal, provided there is a continuing injection of political will
into the process. Today, however, more than two years after the origi-
nally envisaged date for its completion, the full economic and mone-
tary union among Member States with a common Community
currency remains but a dream.54 While the Common Market has led to
a great liberalization of trade and a distinctive degree of integration in
Western Europe, it still lacks the final success since the common rules
agreed upon to date will not succeed in bringing about the ultimate
goal of complete integration without their necessary corollary-a truly
common economic and monetary policy.
54 The European unit of account (EUA) has the rudimentary characteristics of a common
means of payment but it is not a common currency. Rather, it is an accounting measure expressed
on the basis of a "basket" of Community currencies, first used by the European Development
Fund and the European Investment Bank in connection with the 1975 Lome Convention. For
more detail, see Dixon, The European Unit ofAccount, 14 Comm. MKT. L. Rlv. 191 etseq. (1977).
As of January 1, 1981, the EUA was replaced by the European Currency Unit (ECU).
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III. THE COMMON INTEREST
To the foreign observer, frequent reports of disagreement between
Member States' governments on a variety of EEC questions in recent
years may relate a picture of disarray, or even crisis, in the Community.
This is deceptive. Unquestionably, there are at all times contentious
issues to be dealt with, as would be expected in a political undertaking
such as the EEC. But this should not lead to the conclusion that the
Member States are now in a process of disintegration. Progress is
slower today than formerly, simply because so much has already been
achieved. One must remember the tremendous interdependence ex-
isting among all of the Member States, as reflected in the annual trade
statistics and the foreign investment figures confirming year after year
the ever-increasing closeness of ties among the Community countries.
55
One should not underestimate the solid common interest that flows
from this situation, despite regular Cassandra cries published by the
news media. This common interest provides healthy stability, in polit-
ical terms, for Europe today and in the future.56 It is appropriate to
conclude this summary proffle for this symposium of ideas on the cur-
rent state of Community affairs with a commentary emphasizing this
common interest among Member States.
As a lawyer, the author takes particular pleasure from the fact that
Europe's common interest, indeed its common destiny, is built upon,
and governed by, a freely chosen set of rules and legal procedures-the
rule of law has replaced the rule of force in Western Europe, with no
way of return (except by outside impact). The Treaty of Rome pro-
vides a vehicle to transform, in day-to-day life, the common interest of
all Member States into tangible progress in virtually all fields of eco-
nomic and social behavior. One of the major means by which this can
be accomplished is a process commonly referred to as harmonization.
Article 100 provides that the Council, upon proposal from the Commis-
sion, shall "issue directives for the approximation of such provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common mar-
ket." In other words, Community law shall be created to change (har-
55 As an example, exports by all EEC countries to other Member States have exceeded for
many years the exports to non-EEC countries. In 1978 and 1979, EEC countries also imported
more goods from their partners in the Community than from non-Member States. See Monthly
External Trade Bull. 6, 7 (Special No. 1958-1979).
56 To cite Robert Marjolin once again, "[a]fter more than thirty years of achievements and
frustration, Europe has probably reached a point of relative stability. No major progress, nor
setback is in sight. Europe is not, of course, absolutely static, but the movements one can detect
are very slow, sometimes hardly perceptible." LEFFINGWELL LECTURES, supra note 48, at 12.
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monize) national laws where required in the interest of all to afford
everyone the benefits of the wider, unified market created by the EEC.
No better example can be thought of in this respect than the free
movement of goods throughout the Community. This is the quintes-
sential element of a common market and indeed, many directives have
been issued under Article 100 to provide for this free movement of
goods. The harmonization process, however, can also be effected
through judgments of the Court, declaring certain national law inappli-
cable where it stands in the way of free product circulation or where it
is used so as to interfere with the objectives of the Common Market.
An excellent illustration in this respect is the treatment given industrial
and commercial property rights by the Court in Luxembourg. In a dra-
matic way, this treatment illuminates how, in the common interest of
all, the individual interest of a patent, trademark or copyright owner
must yield to the demands of a unified market. For the reader not
particularly familiar with the legal character and the detailed workings
of the EEC, the following remarks may provide an explanation, albeit a
cursory one, of this treatment within the EEC.
No EEC-wide system for the protection of industrial or commer-
cial property rights was adopted at the time the Community was cre-
ated. The Treaty of Rome, in Article 222, recognized instead the
various systems of property ownership existing in the Member States.
Patents, trademarks and copyrights were protected in all Member
States granting the exclusive right to sell and/or manufacture the pro-
tected product within the territory of the individual State. This has not
changed, and the protection of these property rights in the EEC is
therefore still a national affair, based on the well-established principle
of territoriality.57 In contrast, the Common Market was created to
overcome all kinds of barriers to trade between the Member States and
therefore demands, as has been described, complete freedom of move-
ment of goods. In addition, the EEC is based on the principle of free
competition.
With these two legal systems coexisting in the Community after
1958, the national protection of industrial property rights of a territorial
nature on the one hand and the Treaty rules relating to the free move-
ment of goods and free competition on the other, conflicts were inevita-
57 The Community Patent Convention, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 17) 1 (1976), which al-
lows for transnational patent protection in the future, is excluded from consideration here as it is
not relevant to the problem to be discussed infra. Article 43(2) of that Convention permits territo-
rially limited licenses under a European patent. This conflict, as the Commission says, will have
to be resolved in court. See EUROPEAN CommuaNmEs COMMISSION, FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY point 11 (1976).
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ble. A balance had to be struck between both systems without
jeopardizing the essential content of the national rights or the objec-
tives of the EEC Treaty. This delicate task fell onto the Court of Jus-
tice. In its case law the Court has reconciled the basic Community
principle of free trade across all intra-EEC borders with the protection
granted industrial property rights by the -laws of the various Member
States. This reconciliation was achieved by extrapolating from Article
36 an interface delineating the supremacy, under certain circumstances,
of EEC law or national law, respectively. In an analogy to the legal
systems existing in all Member States, whereby distinctions are made
between restrictions on the use of property in favor of an essential pub-
lic interest and the deprivation of the right of ownership as such, the
Court distinguished in its judgments between the existence of a patent,
trademark or copyright and the exercise of such rights by their owners.
The Court pointed out that Article 36, while it allows certain prohibi-
tions or restrictions on free trade in the EEC for the purpose of safe-
guarding some general goals of public interest (among them "the
protection of industrial and commercial property"), it nevertheless de-
mands that these prohibitions or restrictions shall not be used as "a
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between Member States."
As early as 1966, the Court held that neither Article 222 nor Arti-
cle 36 prevent Community law "from having an influence on the exer-
cise of industrial property rights under domestic law.""8 During the
years that followed the Court struck down, in approximately a dozen
judgments, attempts by companies that wanted to exercise their na-
tional patents, trademarks or copyrights in order to prevent imports, re-
imports, or parallel imports of the protected products into their territo-
ries. As a result, the privileges provided to holders of industrial prop-
erty rights under national legislation have been serverely curtailed in
the EEC.59 The use of industrial property rights in the Common Mar-
ket may not lead to a partitioning of this market. The holder of the
right cannot prevent the importation into his territory of the protected
product once he has himself put the product onto the market anywhere
in the EEC or allowed this to happen by granting a license. On the
58 Consten and Grundig v. EEC Commission, [1966] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 429, [1966] Comm.
MKT. REP. (CCH) T8046, at 7654.
59 See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro SB Grossmarkte, [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec.
487, [1971] COMM. MKT. RP. (CCH) 8106 (regarding copyrights); Van Zuylen Fr~res v. Hag
AG, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1974] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8230 (regarding trade-
marks); Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974] Comm.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246 (regarding patents).
EEC Profile
3:640(1981)
other hand, it remains necessary under the jurisprudence of the Court
to balance the principles of free EEC trade and national ownership
rights differently where this is required to protect the very existence of
the industrial property right in a given case. The key to understanding
this difference between the existence of particular rights and the exer-
cise of those rights by their owners is the specific subject matter of the
patent right, the trademark or the copyright. The Court defines this, in
the case of patents and trademarks, as the right of the owner to exploit
commercially, by way of making the first sale, the exclusive right
granted by national legislation. Trademarks are additionally defined
as a guarantee of origin protecting the consumer. Thus, on occasion, a
patent, trademark or copyright owner may prevail over an importer in
the EEC where the objective of industrial property right protection
would be undermined by upholding Community law principles in the
specific situation. 0
In summary, then, it can be stated that industrial and commercial
property rights of the traditional type, (i.e., with territorial character)
are still alive in the EEC and may, depending on the circumstances,
still provide protection against third parties where this is necessary to
preserve the very essence of the right. In most cases, however, the re-
straints on the use of the right, as defined by the Court in order to
encourage the free movement of goods within the EEC, will override
national laws that appear to grant shelter from foreign competition in
other EEC countries. For the purposes of trading in patented, trade-
marked or copyrighted goods in the Community, one should assume, in
case of doubt, that the Commission or the Court will probably decide a
particular situation in favor of Community interests over national law,
a principle that may be referred to as "in dubiopro communitate."
60 Regarding trademarks, see, eg., Terrapin v. Terranova, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1039,
[1976] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8362; Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Centrafarm, [1978] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1139, [1978] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8466; Centrafarm v. American Home Products,
[1978] E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 1823, [1978] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8475.
